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Introduction
There is an overwhelming agreement that a deficit of freedom 
undermines human development. As is also well known, there is 
a dramatic gap between the levels of democracy in Arab countries 
and the rest of the world1. In particular, none of the 16 Arab 
majority countries has a democratically elected government. At 
the same time, the combined GDP of all Arab countries is less 
than that of Spain, and labor productivity in these countries dropped 
between I960 and 1990, while it soared elsewhere in the world. 
Even Africa outperformed the Arab region in rates of economic 
growth, etc.
Nevertheless, there is a group of Arab states in which the 
situation is quite different from the portrait painted above: the 
monarchies of the Gulf. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the 
United Arab Emirates and Oman, members of the so-called Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC), are among the richest countries in 
the world. Further, despite having highly conservative political 
systems, these countries have carried out significant political 
reforms in recent years, given citizens more say in state politics, 
and broadened freedoms. In the broader context of governance, 
the situation in the GCC states looks quite good in comparison to 
that in other Arab countries, and in other regions of the world2.
At the same time, political liberalization in the GCC countries 
has not yet resulted in those countries attaining Western levels of 
democracy, and it is difficult to say when that goal might be 
accomplished. Moreover, there is a fundamental disagreement 
among scholars whether democracy is always the inevitable 
outcome of political liberalization3. In the case of the GCC states, 
it seems that a third type of relatively stable political system,
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somewhere “between” the old authoritarian regimes and Western- 
style democracy, may emerge. In these regimes, certain elements 
of democracy will be present why others will not.
While definitions of democracy vary widely, the term - in its 
minimal connotation - presupposes regime transparency and 
accountability, the equality of all citizens under the law, and 
inclusive rules for political participation. Several initiatives put 
forth by leaders in the GCC states in recent years have aimed to 
move the countries of the region closer to these ideals. There is a 
movement from less transparent and accountable governments to 
more transparent and accountable governments; from less 
competitive (or non-existent) elections to freer, fairer, and more 
competitive elections; from very restricted liberties to better 
protected civil and political rights; from totally censured media to 
relatively independent ones; and from underdeveloped civil society 
institutions to more developed ones4.
Still, much progress needs to be made before the GCC countries 
could be characterized as “democracies” - that is - countries in 
which nearly every adult can vote, elections are freely contested, 
the chief executive is chosen by popular vote or by an elected 
parliament, and civil rights as well as civil liberties are substantially 
guaranteed5. The highly publicized (although controversial) 
Freedom House democracy scale offers evidence for this assertion: 
in 2002, besides Kuwait (which was rated a “partly free” country), 
all GCC states were considered “not free,” and Saudi Arabia was 
labeled one of the world’s ten most repressive regimes6.
This paper describes and analyzes the development of the 
electoral process in the GCC states in the last decade, and examines 
the activities of the consultative councils and parliaments that have 
led to political liberalization. Although introduction of elections 
and broadening of political participation form only a part of the 
complex democratization process, the importance of these 
developments for the future of the societies of the Gulf monarchies 
should not be underestimated.
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Saudi Arabia
Since the beginning of the 1990s, Saudi Arabia has witnessed 
political activity that, while not directly questioning the religious 
base of the country’s identity and legitimacy of rulers, has called 
for changes in the manner of state governance7. In particular, 
various groups submitted petitions to the King demanding political 
reforms. On March 1, 1992, King Fahd decided to take sertain 
actions to calm down the situation. He decreed the long-promised 
Basic Laws - a constitution-like document, the statute for 
a new consultative council, and a system of regional government 
for the kingdom’s 14 provinces.
The most important decision taken concerned the Consultative 
Council, established as a debating assembly consisting of 60 
members appointed by the King8. The Council was to study all 
government regulations, treaties and international accords before 
they are promulgated through royal decree, as well as to deliberate 
upon and evaluate economic and social development programs. 
It was also to discuss annual reports submitted by ministers and 
present recommendations, and was empowered to question the 
cabinet members. The Council cannot, however, initiate debates 
on issues: it either has to obtain permission from the King to do 
so or await submission from the government. The King retained 
the power to dissolve or reorganize the Council at will.
The Consultative Council finally set to work in mid-1990s and 
quickly established itself within Saudi political system. This is why, 
in 1997, the Council was enlarged from 60 to 90 members and 
then in May 2001, to 120 members. Members of the Council were 
chosen from among the country’s regions and important constituent 
groups: religious establishment, government bureaucracy and the 
business community, followers of both conservative and liberal 
ideologies. They have usually been highly-educated and 
experienced people, considered experts in their respective fields 
(academics, retired senior officers, ex-civil servants and private
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businessmen). Sheikh Mohammed bin Ibrahim bin Joubayr, a 
respected Hanbali jurist and former Minister of Justice became the 
President of the first State Council and of successive ones. The 
influence of the Council, not grounded in law, has been a function 
of its members prominence and diversity. It also reflects the tradition 
of governance, which “prizes consensus, strives to maintain 
harmony through consultation and is deeply averse to conflict”9. 
While the verdicts of the Council are neither binding on the King, nor 
on the government, usually either the ministers accept the 
recommendations of the Council or the two parties reach a compromise.
The establishment of the Consultative Council did not satisfy 
the opposition groups, which since 1999 began to submit 
consequent petitions to the King requesting further reforms. An 
informal lobby of liberals, progressive Islamists, nationalists, and 
Shiites became even more vocal after September 11, 2001 attacks, 
in which Saudi militants were heavily involved, the subsequent 
criticism of the Saudi regime, as well as after Al-Qaeda attacks 
inside the Kingdom. Vigorous debate then started about the causes 
of extremism, with usual conclusion that the closed nature of the 
Saudi political system, imposed to large extent by a religious 
establishment, was the main reason for that. Of particular 
importance in that movement was petition submitted to King Fahd 
in January 200310. The petition called “A Vision for the Present 
and the Future of the Nation”, was signed by 104 academics, 
businessmen, religious scholars and professionals from various 
regions and representing different religious and political 
orientations11. Among various issues raised in the petition, its 
signatories called for providing the Consultative Council with 
legislative and control powers and made it an elected body, as 
well as for an independent judiciary, freedom of expression and 
the establishment of civil society institutions. The petition, despite 
its non-confrontational tone and respectful language towards the 
monarchy, essentially suggested the establishment of institutions 
to curb the power of the ruling family and guarantee popular
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participation in decision-making, replacing a system with ruler’s 
absolute power with the constitutional monarchy in which power 
is shared with elected representatives12.
Another petition signed by more than 300 Saudis, including at 
this time 50 women, Sunnis and Shiites from all parts of the 
Kingdom appeared in September 2003. The petition entitled “In 
Defense of the Nation” basically repeated the demands from the 
previous petition but in the view of the emergence of terrorist 
activity in the Kingdom, openly blamed the existing political 
restrictions for its development. “Being late in adopting radical 
reforms and ignoring popular participation in decision-making 
have been the main reasons that helped the fact that our country 
reached this dangerous turn”13.
In yet another petition prepared in December, this time again 
jointly by a diversified group of Islamists, liberals and Shiites, 
titled “An Appeal to the Leadership and the People: Constitutional 
Reform First”, the signatories called for the implementation of the 
reforms outlined in the January petition and went even further, 
demanding adoption of the constitution, which would construct 
“a modern Arab Islamic state”14.
A response of the government to these petitions was the 
organization of broad debates, the so-called National Dialogue 
sessions. The issue of elections was raised during the second debate 
which took place in Mecca in December 2003 and gathered 60 
intellectuals, clerics and businesspeople, including 10 women 
(seated in a different room). Various political, social and educational 
problems were openly discussed at the meeting which ended in 
the formulation of 18 recommendations that were later formally 
presented to the acting ruler, Crown Prince Abdullah. Among others, 
they included holding elections for the Consultative Council and 
local consultative councils, encouraging establishment of trade 
unions, voluntary associations and other civil society institutions, 
separating the legislative, executive and judiciary powers, as well 
as broadening freedom of expression15.
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The National Dialogue recommendations generally reflected 
opinions on the discussed matters of the Saudi society at large. In 
particular, Saudis seem to be in favor of political reforms. In 
probably the first, relatively independent opinion pool on the matter 
conducted in the latter half of 2003, 85 per cent of respondents 
thought that political reform would be beneficial for the country 
and 90 per cent wanted to grant more rights to women16. Somewhat 
contradictory, only 12 per cent of respondents had a positive view 
of liberal reformers, probably because they associated them only 
with the writing of inefficient petitions, while political reforms 
were perceived the most pressing concern for less than 10 per 
cent of respondents.
Responding to internal demands from liberals and the US pro­
democracy pressures, the government began to think about 
organizing first elections in the country, to municipal councils, 
following a well tested pattern in neighboring Bahrain and Qatar. 
Prince Abdullah stated in his address to the Consultative Council 
that “municipal elections will be the beginning of the Saudi citizens’ 
participation in the political system”, while the Foreign Minister, 
prince Saud Al-Faisal, similarly remarked that Saudi Arabia “has 
reached a stage in our development that requires expanding 
political participations”. In turn, Prince Turki al-Faisal said that 
“reforming the Kingdom is not a choice, it is a necessity”17. Such 
vocabulary used to be taboo among the ruling family18. In this 
liberalized mode, the issue of elections became widely discussed 
throughout the Kingdom. As Islamist reformer, Abd al-Aziz al- 
Qasim stated: “It is hard to overestimate the importance of this 
step in a society where non-interference in politics is considered 
the condition of good citizenship. [The local] elections in themselves 
may not have much substance, but the decision to hold them 
breaks a barrier and establishes the principle that society can 
participate in making policy”19.
Many Saudi officials, however, have continued to be afraid of 
such a move. They believe that elections would pose too great
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a risk to stability of the country and strengthen the hand of radical 
Islamists. Some of them claim that “because conformity to strict 
religious dogma remains the principal criterion for judging matters 
public and private ... political debates could potentially turn into 
religious clashes”, while “the culture of democracy accepts the 
pluralism of opinions and relativity in all things. How can you 
reconcile relativity with a society that is governed by religion?” 
and “democracy now will produce something very similar to the 
Taliban”20.
With such thoughts in mind, the government decided to go 
ahead only with elections to municipal councils. Nevertheless, 
only half of the seats were to be appointed through ballot (the 
remaining was to be made of nominated incumbents, in theory 
the ones with the experience to assists the new members), second, 
that elections in 178 municipalities would be held in three phases: 
on February 10, 2005 in Riyadh and the surrounding areas, on 
March 3, in the eastern and southwestern regions and on April 21 
in the remaining parts of the country (including Mecca and Medina, 
until than bust with the Hajj pilgrimage). That approach was 
designed for the authorities to take a step and evaluate the impact 
of elections before proceeding to the next phase.
Saudi women were not allowed to vote or to stand in the 
elections. That decision made conservatives relieved and liberals 
dismayed. Nevertheless, women may be allowed to do so during 
the next elections in four years. In fact, election rules are written 
ambiguously and for quite a time it was unclear whether they can 
participate even in the first elections or not21. The officially cited 
reasons for not allowing women to participate in the elections 
were of administrative and legislative character and also the result 
of the Kingdom’s limited experience in conducting elections. They 
did not stress the religion norms or Saudi customs, just creating 
a window of hope for many liberals22.
Surprisingly, in late November 2004, the government allowed 
women for the first time to participate in the elections: to choose
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board members of the Saudi chambers of commerce and industry 
(in the past, men voted on behalf of women members). 
Nevertheless, only a small number of women used that 
opportunity23.
Establishing the municipality councils through elections is an 
innovation for this deeply conservative country used to tribal and 
extended-family system of politics. It can be expected that, though 
once the election is seen to work, the next ones will be for the 
whole municipal councils, then for regional councils, and eventually 
for the Consultative Council. Prince Sultan bin Abdel Aziz, the 
minister of defense and a key figure in the ruling family told the 
Consultative Council, that the country leadership agrees with 
demands that this body should be developed and given further 
powers, to “monitor” and “supervise” the government in particular24. 
Following this reasoning, the royal decree of November 29, 2003, 
enhanced the Consultative Council rights to act as a partly legislative 
as opposed to purely advisory body. In particular, individual 
members were granted authority to propose new legislation and 
to have more power in disputes with the cabinet. At the same 
time, it was decided to begin, for the first time, televised coverage 
of the weekly sessions of the Consultative Council. That became 
an important decision, as Saudis have a traditional aversion to 
public debate, preferring to settle matters behind the closed doors 
instead. The Shura members and Saudi intellectual elite welcomed 
these steps, although, especially following the Kuwaiti 
parliamentarian model, they clearly want further enhancement of 
the Council’s role, in particular to make it the elective assembly, 
with power to pass the budget, to give or withdrew confidence 
from ministers and to separate the office of prime minister from 
that of the King25. Responding to such proposals Prince Sultan 
dismissed, however, calls for an elected Council, saying that voters 
may choose illiterate and unqualified candidates to it and that the 
move would not serve national interests. “In some countries there 
are political parties and elections but the result is nothing, because
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of their quarrels and conflicts between them”26. Instead, on January 
26, 2005, Prince Sultan announced that the Shura Council would 
be further expanded from 120 to 150 members and that in the 
next term all tribes and villages will be represented in it.
Allowing municipal elections to take place seems to be a tacit 
recognition by the ruling family that some reforms are needed, 
including greater transparency and accountability of decision 
making. Nevertheless, the rise of internal security challenges - 
the extremist Islamist violence - makes it difficult for the 
government to advance further the reform agenda. The leading 
members of the Saudi ruling family are not in agreement over the 
causes of existing tensions in the country and possible actions to 
be taken to confront them. In particular, many of them are afraid 
that political openings can be perceived in some quarters as a 
victory for “liberal” forces, a fact that may reinvigorate Islamist 
attacks. For that reason, the Saudi government is anxious to depict 
the whole process leading to municipal elections as being wholly 
compatible with Islam. This is an important matter as many Islamists 
consider the elections un-Islamic. In particular, Osama bin Laden 
in the message released on December 16, 2004 criticized the 
elections, noting “it is haram (forbidden) to participate in legislative 
bodies ... because Allah is the only lawgiver”27.
Nevertheless, in an interesting development, the first round of 
elections, which took place in the Riyadh region on February 10, 
2005, was won by Islamists, who took all of the seven available 
seats. Around 140,000 men had registered to vote out of 400,000 
eligible voters in the area; 65 per cent of them went to the pools 
in the capital, while in other districts the turnout often exceeded 
even 80 per cent. Six hundred and forty-six candidates were on 
the list. Immediately after the results were announced, many loosing 
candidates accused the winning seven of illegal formulation of an 
Islamist alliance, using the backing of Saudi religious establishment 
to get votes, and breaking election laws for campaigning on the 
election day. The winners denied all the allegations. Interestingly
- 11 -
enough, the winners used neither ads in the Saudi dailies, nor 
posters, nor did they set up “discussion tents” where they could 
meet potential voters, as all loosing candidates did. Instead, they 
skillfully used Internet and mobile phones (short text messages), 
the tactic often used by Islamist groupings in the region. Thus, 
“The Riyadh elections should not be viewed as just an experiment 
in democracy, but also as a window into the possible ramifications 
that come with democracy in the kingdom. If the truth be told, the 
group that wanted victory the most - the Islamists - won”28.
Kuwait
Kuwaiti constitution, since 1961, gives the Emir broad executive 
powers. In particular, it is he who appoints the prime minister and 
the cabinet. At the same time, the constitution established 
a partially elected parliament with some legislative powers; for 
several decades it had been the only national assembly of that 
kind in the GCC states29. The parliament has never been a rubber- 
stamp and always discussed openly the vital Kuwaiti issues. Its 
criticism of the government, or from the other perspective, its 
activities perceived as threatening the political stability of the 
country, caused the Emir to dissolve it in 1976 (until the 
reestablishment in 1981) and again in 1986. When Saddam Hussein 
attacked Kuwait, the parliament was still disbanded. After the 
liberation of Kuwait from the Iraqi forces, the Emir, Sheikh Jabir al 
Ahmad al-Sabah was not eager to keep his earlier promises of 
prompt restoration of the assembly. Only after the mobilization of 
all Kuwaiti political factions, culminating in the presentation of a 
petition in the spring of 1991, did the emir agree to hold 
parliamentary elections in October 1992.
After years of limited political activity, the election campaign 
was very lively30. Despite the non-existence of formal political 
parties, individual candidates in their diwaniyyas as well as various 
voluntary and professional associations were effective in articulating
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critical views, helping to increase political awareness and activities 
of different groups of society. In effect, the election brought to 
the parliament a majority of opposition and independent deputies.
Right after the election the opposition called for the separation 
of the previously combined offices of prime minister and crown 
prince, as traditionally in Kuwait, the crown prince (as well as the 
whole al-Sabah family) were not subject to any criticism or control. 
Only when in a conciliatory move, the Emir appointed several 
members of parliament (who retained some credibility due to the 
fact that they had been popularly elected) as ministers for the first 
time, the opposition eventually gave up and accepted the status 
quo. Nevertheless, parliamentary committees initiated a series of 
investigations including inquires into the events leading to the 
Iraqi invasion, government responsibility for the Kuwaiti defeat, 
alleged corruption and mismanagement in the Kuwait Investment 
Office (which manages the country’s overseas capital), and the 
cost-effectiveness of arms-deals with Western powers. These were 
very sensitive issues whose investigation led to confrontation with 
top government officials, including members of the ruling family. 
This was the first time in the history of the GCC countries that 
such people were publicly questioned, strongly criticized and forced 
to take responsibility for their actions. The whole term of parliament 
was alive with heated debates over the issue of power and wealth 
sharing, corruption and waste in defense expenditure, the way 
the privatization was conducted, and other important issues. The 
parliament also decided to broaden the base of its electorate, 
extending the right to vote to the large number of sons of 
naturalized Kuwaiti citizens (naturalized men are eligible to vote 
only if they have held Kuwaiti citizenship for at least 20 years).
After tough experiences with dealings with the opposition, the 
government made serious efforts to influence the results of next 
elections, and the parliament chosen in October 1996 was not as 
confrontational as the previous one had been. Nevertheless, 
tensions between Islamist groups in the assembly and the
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government did not subside. In effect, in 1998, the parliament 
blocked the government deal with the US to buy the so-called 
Paladin artillery due to irregularities in the procurement process. 
Then, in 1999, the Islamists attempted to bring down Sheikh Saud 
Nasser al Sabah, the Minister of Information. His ministry had 
permitted books critical of Islamic orthodoxy to be displayed at 
the international book fair in Kuwait. The minister had to resign. 
The government perceived the action of the opposition as a breach 
of the unwritten agreement that Islamists would never attack 
members of the ruling family. The Crown Prince and Prime Minister, 
Sheikh Saad al Abdallah al-Sabah warned that criticizing the ruling 
family jeopardizes the security of the country, and that this security 
would be always put “over and above democracy”31. The Islamists, 
however, continued to criticize the government. In turn, they 
attacked the Minister of Religious Affairs for publishing 
a version of the Koran with typographical errors. Tensions 
increased. When the whole cabinet threatened to resign, the Emir 
dissolved the parliament and called for new elections.
The election campaign was again characterized by intense 
activity on the part of various political groupings which in meantime 
had grown in popularity32. During traditional political meetings in 
diwaniyyas, candidates openly charged the government with 
conspiracy, interference in the elections, incompetence, corruption, 
etc. Women’s political rights became a central issue in the campaign 
as the Emir, in a surprising move, announced his intention to 
award women the right to participate in future elections. Islamist 
groups opposed the decision and the Emir’s decree was eventually 
defeated in the all-male parliament. Another highly debated issue 
was the suspended right to hold tribal primaries, whose results 
had significantly affected previous general elections.
Altogether, 288 candidates competed for the 50 parliamentary 
seats during the elections of July 3, 1999- Nevertheless, only 113,000 
men out of the total Kuwaiti population of 793,000 cast their ballots, 
showing a relative lack of interest in political proceedings. Six
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groupings played a crucial role in the election campaign and won 
seats in the parliament: the Islamic Constitutional Movement 
(closely connected to the Muslim Brotherhood), the Kuwaiti 
Democratic Forum (the alliance of liberals, Arab nationalists, leftists, 
and independents), the Islamic Popular Bloc (an orthodox Salafi 
group demanding strict implementation of the Islamic law), the 
Salafi Movement (a splinter of the Popular Bloc), the National 
Islamic Alliance (a Shiite Islamist group) and the National 
Democratic Bloc (a liberal group connected with the academic 
and business communities). In the elections the Islamists won 18 
seats altogether: six went to Shiite candidates and remaining 12 to 
Sunnis. The main losers were the pro-government candidates, with
11 major incumbents losing what earlier had been considered 
secured seats.
The winning Islamists, in a short period of time, undertook 
a number of actions in the new parliament. In effect, an entirely 
new Sharia-inspired version of the penal code was adopted together 
with a ban on festivals and concerts “that are against tradition and 
morality”. Later the Islamists also managed to force the government 
to re-introduce gender segregation at the Kuwaiti university. In 
general, Islamists have wanted to widen the role of the Islamic 
law. They would like to amend the constitution, changing the 
clause that Sharia is “a main source of legislation” for “the source 
of the legislation”. They also requested the right that no law may 
be promulgated by the Emir unless it has been passed by the 
National Assembly first"'3. Finally, they would like to get Kuwait’s 
political parties licensed and formally written into the country’s 
legal system. These motions were re-introduced in the following 
years, but not approved yet.
In 2002 a new crisis between parliament and the government 
occurred when the Finance Minister, Youssef al-Ibrahim was 
accused of abuse of power and misappropriation of public funds. 
In particular, Islamist and independent deputies wanted him to 
acknowledge officially that senior ruling family members authorized
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the expenditure of billions of dollars without the supervision of 
the Audit Bureau, the legislature watchdog for monitoring state 
finances. The interpellation proceeded to a vote of confidence. 
But when Sheikh Sabah, the Acting Prime Minister, threatened 
that the whole cabinet would resign if the minister lost the vote, 
the majority of deputies decided not to support the no-confidence 
motion. Another crisis was avoided.
The following parliamentary elections were held on July 5,
2003. They were affected by the political situations in the region34. 
Removal of Saddam Hussein influenced the campaign as 
government could not use the Iraqi threat any more to secure 
support for its own candidates. In times of change in the Gulf, 
liberals pushing for modernization of the country expected to 
obtain more seats in the assembly. On the other hand, Shiites also 
hoped to do better thanks to internal mobilization of the group, 
caused by developments in Iraq, where the Shiite majority begun 
gaining power after years of discrimination. Tensions between 
the US and Iran, in the period when Kuwait was improving its 
relations with the Islamic Republic, were also expected to influence 
the election results. The issue of extending vote to women became 
again an important issue in the campaign, especially among liberals. 
Some women voted in a mock election as a demonstration of 
their desire to obtain more political rights in the country35.
The election expectations proved wrong. First of all, liberals 
suffered a stunning setback. “Shock and horror. Parliament topples 
liberals” was the headline in the daily AlAnbaa. Both members of 
the Democratic Platform present in the previous assembly, including 
prominent opposition leader, Abdallah al-Nibari, lost their seats. 
Independent liberals went down from six seats to four. In turn, 
the Islamist traditionalists, both Sunni and Shiite, became the 
election winners, taking 21 of the 50 seats. At the same time, the 
members of parliament affiliated with existing political groupings 
went down from 32 to 25, probably due to government’s efforts to 
weaken all the unofficial political parties. The so-called “service”
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candidates, who emphasized their constituent services rather than 
political or ideological platforms, did also well in a number of 
districts. Interestingly, two of three Islamist political groupings 
also lost seats. The Islamic Constitutional Movement (in the past 
connected with Muslim Brotherhood) went from five to two seats, 
while the National Islamic Alliance (Shiite) went from three seats to 
one. In turn, the salafi groupings gained seats, with the Salafi 
Movement rising from a single seat to three. Independent Sunni 
Islamists went up from five seats during the previous term to six and 
independent Shiite Islamists - from two to three. In general, the 
Assembly became rather equally divided between pro-government 
lawmakers and Islamist-dominated opposition, with a very small 
presence of liberals. The defeat of liberals was probably much 
influenced by the American politics in the Middle East. President 
Bush’s initiative to bring democracy to the region while occupying 
Iraq “sends many native liberals and democrats under their beds”, 
worrying of being labeled as American puppets36. Elections were not 
completely clean: there were accusations of increased vote buying, 
switching districts and registering in different areas37.
Right after the elections, Kuwait’s Emir, Sheikh Jaber, appointed 
Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al Sabah the prime minister. For the first 
time in the history of Kuwait, the post of the prime minister was 
separated from the post of the Crown Prince, officially as 
a response to the public demand, in reality maybe only due to the 
poor health of the Crown Prince. The decision had a significant 
meaning as in this way the prime minister can now be placed 
before legal inquires in the parliament, which had been impossible 
in the past as the Kuwaiti constitution grants full immunity to the 
ruler and the Crown Prince.
The first major clash between the new parliament and the 
government occurred in March 2004. Many deputies tried to force 
the resignation of the Minister of Finance, Mahmoud Al Nouri 
over allegations of mismanagement and squandering public money. 
Eventually, the minister won the non-confidence vote; nevertheless
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the opposition accused the government of applying pressure on 
numerous deputies to achieve that goal.
In May 2004, the government introduced a bill allowing women 
to vote and to stand for election. The parliament, however, 
remained divided on the issue of women’s suffrage and has taken 
no action on the bill yet. At the same time, the Ministry of Islamic 
Affairs, responding to pressure from Islamist parliamentarians, 
announced fatwa “forbidding women singing to men, reveal part 
of their body and using vulgar words and dancing”38. To attend or 
watch such concerts and provide any assistance or investment in 
them was also forbidden. Several Islamist deputies have also been 
trying to ban musical education from schools as anti-Islamic activity. 
In December, Islamist deputies accused the Information Minister, 
Mohammed Abu Al Hasan over allowing “immoral” Western-style 
concerts in the country, seen by them as violating Sharia law. To 
avoid questioning in the parliament over the issue the Minister 
resigned. The situation created additional tensions, as Mohammed 
Abu Al Hasan was the only Shiite member of the cabinet and was 
“grilled” by the Sunni lawmakers. Many Shiites, who constitute 
about 30 per cent of the Kuwaiti population, perceived this move 
as discriminatory.
Tensions between the government and the opposition occurred 
also in June 2004, when voting on a long debated bill on reducing 
the number of electoral districts (to eliminate vote-buying, a strategy 
that is easy in small districts) was postponed. Liberal deputies 
accused government and many of their colleagues in the assembly 
of trying to maintain the undemocratic status quo39. However, if 
this bill is eventually passed, the government will probably push 
harder for women’s suffrage. The government anticipates that on 
the whole, women will constitute a moderate, pro-government 
force, which can mitigate the destabilizing effects that redistricting 
would have on Kuwait’s complex political scene40. Including 
women in the election process would significantly expand the 
voter base in the country where only approximately 15 per cent
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of the population are eligible to vote. So far, however, the bill to 
allow women to participate in the elections is on hold, as well as 
the motion to allow servicemen to vote and the one lowering the 
voting age from 21 to 18. In the meantime, a survey conducted by 
the Islamic Constitutional Movement, the Kuwaiti chapter of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, showed that 80 per cent of those polled 
believed that women should only be allowed to vote, but not to 
become candidates; apparently only five per cent supported the 
notion that women must participate fully41.
Tensions continued in the fall of 2004 over a variety of issues, 
including the government second postponement of municipal 
elections, originally scheduled for summer 2003- The main reason 
for the authorities not to call the elections yet has been that the 
government wants to amend the Municipal Law first, to include 
the participation of all nationals, women as well as men. This has 
been strongly opposed by a number of Islamist and tribal 
parliamentarians.
There are several other important motions recently presented 
by the lawmakers, which are under consideration. There is a 
proposal to lower the number of the country’s electoral 
constituencies from the current 25 to 10 in an effort to clamp 
down on alleged fraud in parliamentary elections. Another motion 
calls to raise the number of deputies from the current 50 to 60, to 
reflect the population growth and to allow the cabinet to expand 
from its current 15 to 20 members as according to Kuwaiti law, 
the number of cabinet ministers, who are ex officio members of 
the parliament cannot exceed one-third of the parliament; now 
many of them have multiple portfolios, which hampers effective 
governance. The last call requires however, to amend the 
constitution, much more difficult proposal to conduct.
At the beginning of 2005, a large confusion in the Kuwaiti 
political scene was caused by establishing the Hizb Al Ummah 
political party by the hard-line branch of the Sunni Islamist salafi 
movement. Neither constitutional provisions nor regulatory laws
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deal with the issue in a satisfactory manner, and so far the 
government always opposed the idea. Members of the organizing 
committee of the party were interrogated and a travel ban was 
imposed on them. The move created a heated debate as, on one 
hand, all political groupings would have liked to obtain a chance 
to transform themselves into formal political parties, institutions 
necessary in each mature democracy, but, on the other hand, 
liberals and moderate Shiites have been afraid that the move in 
that direction done by radicals Islamists can backfire and be 
dangerous for political stability of the country.
The mood at the beginning of the 21st century in Kuwait, in 
contrast to its Bahraini and Qatari neighbors, is not very optimistic. 
Many Kuwaitis feel that their country is stagnating, that authorities 
and parliamentarians are caught up in endless squabbles over 
minor issues, instead of transforming the country, which many 
young, innovative rulers of the neighboring GCC states already 
did42. There are voices questioning any possibility of further 
democratization of the state. Ghanim Alnajjar believes, that 
“structural and political weaknesses in the Kuwaiti political system 
continue to hinder the spread of democracy, and may yet cause 
its failure, which might result in a major future political crisis”43. 
According to many, the reasons for limited progress toward the 
more participatory government is the ruling family’s tacit alliance 
with Islamic fundamentalists (for example, to please them the 
government in recent years established a committee on Islamization 
of the law, refused to register civil society institutions except Islamic 
charities and introduced more religious instruction into school 
curricula)44. “We have lost the 12 years since the liberation because 
of the resistance of the political Islamic movement” said Saud 
Nasir Sabah, oil minister and former ambassador to the United 
States45. In general, many believe that Kuwaiti democracy is in 
trouble. “There is not a democratic system in Kuwait, there is not 
democracy here”, said Mohammed Qadiri, a former diplomat, who 
quit the foreign service over the dissolution of parliament in 198646.
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Similarly, Nasr Yousef al-Abdali, one of the leaders of the newly 
launched Justice and Development Movement, noted that 
“Democracy in Kuwait is a lie. The whole process has been hijacked 
by the fight between the Islamists and liberals who are not really 
looking to the future of the country”47.
The situation in Kuwait has been, of course, a complex one. 
By many measures Kuwait has had a more developed civil society 
than found elsewhere among the GCC states. It has critical press 
enjoying relative freedom, a tradition of public debate in the 
diwaniyyas, established political groupings and active parliament, 
which exercises significant influence and control over governance 
by the ruling family. On the other hand - a fact emphasized every 
year by the US State Department report on human rights - there is 
a restricted freedom of assembly, as well as discrimination of 
women, Shiites and foreign residents, censorship of “morally 
offensive” materials, and lack of the independence of the judiciary, 
to mention a few problems only. Altogether, so far, the country 
remains a tightly controlled hereditary emirate, where the al Sabah 
family still wield undeniable power.
Bahrain
Bahrain has been a state vulnerable to political conflicts. First 
of all, the country is relatively poor when compared to its oil-rich 
neighbors; therefore rulers cannot offer their subjects as much as 
in the neighboring countries and the unemployment in the country 
has often been high. Secondly, it is ruled by a Sunni minority, and 
the Shiite majority in the island have often considered themselves 
discriminated against. The al-Khalifa family ruling the country had 
a monopoly on power until the adoption of the constitution in 
1973, which provided for a partially elected National Assembly. 
The Assembly was short lived though. In 1975 the emir called its 
activities “obstructionist” and dissolved it. With the Iranian
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revolution of 1979 and the accompanying spread of its Islamic 
ideas, resentment among Bahrain’s Shiite population against the 
regime intensified. Since then the Shiites clashed with the 
government numerous times. In particular, they demanded the 
restoration of the National Assembly through direct and free 
elections as mandated by the constitution, hoping that in such a 
way they may have more to say in the country’s affairs.
Tensions grew also after the Second Gulf War. In July 1992 
over 200 Bahrainis, both Sunnis and Shiites, signed and submitted 
to the Emir a petition demanding liberalization of the regime. 
Rather than complying with their demands, Emir Sheikh Isa bin 
Sulman al-Khalifa established the appointed Consultative Council. 
Like its Saudi or UAE counterparts, the Bahraini Council could 
only review legislation sent to it by the government. Nevertheless, 
in an attempt to improve relations with the opposition, 30 members 
of the Council were divided between Sunnis and Shiites, and a 
Shiite, former minister of transportation Ibrahim I lamidan, became 
its President. Despite thses, protests continued. When the 
Committee of the Popular Petition, created in 1994, sent another 
petition to the Emir calling for greater popular participation in 
government, the leaders of the Committee were arrested, leading 
to a two-year long wave of demonstrations and riots.
The situation began to change only in 1998 when, after the 
death of Sheikh Isa, his son, Sheikh Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa, 
decided to liberalize the system. In the beginning of the year 
2000, he appointed new members to the Consultative Council, 
including non-Muslims for the first time: a Jewish, a Christian and 
an Indian Bahraini, as well as four women. Then, the Emir abolished 
the emergency laws that were in the force in the country for 25 
years and pardoned more than 900 prisoners and exiles; in effect 
many prominent figures of the former opposition, mostly Shiites, 
returned to the country. At the same time Sheikh Hamad promised 
to grant nationality to several thousand of bidoon, mostly Shiite 
stateless inhabitants, which became another source of tension.
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The Emir decided also to compensate government employees, 
mostly Shiites, for salaries lost while they were detained without a 
trial in connection with the political unrest of the 1990s. As all 
these measures were welcomed by the Shiite majority, the Emir 
became ready to reform his country significantly.
In December 2000, the special committee operating under Emir’s 
instructions proposed far-reaching changes to the political system 
of Bahrain. “The National Action Charter” proposed by the 
Committee, stated that “there is agreement on the need to 
modernize the constitution of the country to benefit from the 
democracy experiences of other peoples in expanding the circle 
of popular participation in the tasks of ruling and administration”48. 
The Charter, a constitutional declaration, made Bahrain a 
constitutional monarchy; Sheikh Hamad - the King, and the al- 
Khalifa family hereditary rulers of the island. A parliament was to 
be established with two chambers with equal legislative powers: 
Council of Deputies consisting of 40 members elected by popular 
vote, and a consultative council, the Shura Council, also composed 
of 40 people but appointed by the King. The executive power, the 
legislature, and the judiciary were to be separated. All citizens 
were made equal in the eyes of law regardless of their religion, 
sect or social class. Constitutional Court and Audit Bureau were to 
be established and enjoy full independence.
The changes proposed in the National Action Charter were 
submitted to a referendum and on February 14, 2001 
overwhelmingly approved by the Bahrainis (98.4 per cent), 
including the Shiite opposition.
On the first anniversary of the referendum, on February 14, 
2002, Sheikh Hamad issued royal decrees reinstating the suspended 
1973 constitution and amending it to implement the above- 
mentioned changes, which practically meant the promulgation of 
the new constitution.
Opposition was not completely satisfied with these developments. 
They would have preferred the restoration of the old constitution
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without changes and reinstatement of the elected parliament. They 
criticized the fact that most powers remained in the ruler’s hands, 
including full control of the government, right to dismiss the prime 
minister, and dissolve parliament for any “sufficient reasons”, as 
well as in case of “emergencies”49. The opposition also complained 
about the way the reforms were introduced; the King unilaterally 
made constitutional changes, contrary to the unambiguous provisions 
of the 1973 constitution itself, and in the absence of elected 
legislature. Moreover, the opposition criticized the fact, that the 
appointed chamber would have a direct legislative role equal to 
that of the elected chamber and even taking certain precedence 
over the elected one, as its chairman was to be the speaker of the 
whole new bi-cameral National Assembly (the government argues 
that the appointed Shura Council is needed to guarantee that 
experienced and highly educated public figures would be able to 
take part in the process of policy making).
Despite the shortcomings of the introduced reforms, in the 
new situation in the country, numerous political groups, the so- 
called “societies”, ranging from Islamic fundamentalist to liberals 
and Marxists, came into being. The Bahraini law does not allow to 
operate a political party in the country, but these societies quickly 
begun to play the role of full fledged parties. The government 
tolerates the existence of the opposition holding open forums 
and issuing weekly magazines. Moreover, non-governmental 
organizations of all types: cultural, religious, and civic as well as 
trade unions have mushroomed’0.
After amending the constitution, the King called for the first 
elections: at the municipal level. Women as well as foreigners 
who owned property and were legal residents on the island were 
allowed to participate. Political groupings actively engaged 
themselves in the election process. The authorities were criticized 
for redrawing the map of electoral constituencies to moderate, if 
not totally eliminate, the effects of the Shiite majority in most 
regions of Bahrain. Shiites voiced their grievances that “the
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government is playing the sectarian card and trying to derail the 
democratic process through gerrymandering”51. To calm down the 
existing tensions, King Hamad decided that all members of the 
Bahraini Defense Force, the National Guard, the police and security 
services would not be eligible to vote. Therefore, a solid bloc of 
approximately 15,000 Sunni voters was removed from the scene, 
giving more chances to Shiite candidates. The King, addressing 
the public before the Election Day, called on his subjects “to 
exercise their constitutional right in complete freedom and 
responsibility. To exercise this right is a duty because without it 
democracy will not be able to survive”52.
The elections took place on May 9 and 16, 2002, in two rounds 
of voting. Over 300 candidates, including 31 women, were 
registered for five 10-seat councils. Voters’ turnover was substantial: 
40-80 per cent, depending on the district. Religiously affiliated 
candidates became the major winners, obtaining 38 out of 50 seats 
(remaining candidates were considered independent runners). The 
Shiite Islamic National Wafaq Society, generally in opposition to 
the King, succeeded in placing most of its candidates in the councils. 
The failure of liberal and leftist candidates to win a single seat 
meant that they were unable to present themselves to the public 
as a viable alternative to candidates supported by the clerical 
establishment. The poor turnout of women was not really surprising 
in the traditional, male-dominated society, especially as in most 
cases they ran against male candidates from the same political 
organizations. Nevertheless, after the elections, all of women 
candidates urged the King to order an investigation into the 
“transgressions” witnessed during the elections and to take the 
necessary steps against those behind them53. They complained 
that some male candidates used mosques and religious community 
centers to launch attacks on female candidates. The leading leftist 
group, the National Democratic Action Society also criticized 
undemocratic practices exercised by many candidates on the 
polling day, including illegal campaigning and vote buying.
- 25  -
The municipal elections were not that important in themselves, as 
the municipal councils are responsible only for public works and 
roads, but everybody perceived them as the “dress rehearsal” for the 
forthcoming crucial pools to elect members to the new parliament.
When the parliamentary elections were approaching, in August
2002, 78 Bahraini intellectuals presented the King with 
a petition, protesting against the ban on the participation of political 
associations in the elections campaign. Then, four major opposition 
groups (the Islamic National Wafaq, the National Democratic Action, 
the Islamic Action and the Democratic Nationalist Tajammu) sent 
a letter to the King demanding again the restoration of the un­
changed 1973 constitution. In response to these protests, the King 
allowed political associations to participate in the election 
campaign. Nevertheless, as other demands were not met, major 
opposition groups decided to boycott the elections.
In such circumstances, only 190 candidates registered, much 
fewer than for the far less important municipal elections. Eight 
women decided to run in the elections, receiving highly publicized 
support from the King’s wife.
The first round of parliamentary elections took place on October 
24. Despite calls from the opposition to boycott the elections, 
53-2 per cent voters went to the polls, well above most expectations. 
Nineteen candidates who obtained more than 50 per cent of the 
vote were elected to the 40-seat Parliament in the first round, 
including three who ran unopposed. The remaining 21 seats were 
decided in the run-off elections on October 31-
Elections went smoothly. The Bahraini Human Rights Society 
was allowed to monitor the polls. Nevertheless, opposition groups 
said that the government used authoritarian tactics to thwart the 
boycott. Moreover, voters had their passports stamped, leading to 
fears among citizens that they might suffer consequences if they 
did not have the stamp.
Sunni Islamists became the winners of the election, obtaining, 
together with their sympathizers, a majority in the lower house.
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Two Shiite Islamists were elected as well, despite the fact that 
their numerous co-religionists stayed home obeying the boycott 
call from their party leaders. Both woman candidates who made it 
to the second round run-off were defeated. Therefore, to balance 
the composition of the state bodies and to lower future potential 
problems in the legislature, the King himself appointed a large 
number of pro-government “secularists”, “liberals” and women to 
the upper house. In particular, he nominated several defense 
officials and public servants, whose number included six women 
and a Jewish trader.
Political life in the country intensified further after the 
parliamentary elections.
The Council of Deputies demanded more legislative and 
monitoring powers for itself’4. Several members of the Council 
submitted a proposal to legalize political parties. The deputies 
formed a commission to investigate the collapse of two 
government-managed pension funds. The Commission, despite 
government objections, submitted in January 2004 a report 
providing information of extensive mismanagement and corruption 
by the funds’ senior staff. In result, the deputies question the 
Minister of Finance, the Minister of Labor, and Minister of State on 
the matter. It was a significant move as it established a parliamentary 
tradition55. The government, however, managed to gain the upper 
hand in the proceedings which could lead to no-confidence vote 
using legal technicalities and ministers remained in their posts intact.
In turn, the nominated Shura Council, trying also to stress its 
role in the country’s political system, urged the media to play a 
greater role in the democratization process, and asked the 
government to draw up a comprehensive national strategic plan 
of social and economic developments for the next 20 years, to 
establish the Financial Monitoring Bureau to help combat 
corruption, and the Administrative Monitoring Bureau to verify 
the soundness and legality of administrative systems and their 
compatibility with international quality standards in this regard56.
- 27  -
In another important development, six of Bahrain’s major 
political groups, religious and secular, signed in March 2003 a 
“charter of unity”, aimed to coordinate their opposition to the 
kingdom’s amended constitution, which they claimed to have 
eliminated the principle of separation of power. There were three 
Islamists groups: The Islamic National Wefaq Society, the Islamic 
Arab Wasat Society, and the Islamic Action Society as well as 
three secular groups with left-wing inclinations: the National 
Democratic Action Society, the Progressive Democratic Minbar 
Society, and the Nationalist Block. All these groups boycotted the 
parliamentary elections as they insisted that the elected council 
should have exclusive legislative powers. In April, they started a 
campaign of collecting signatures on a petition to the King to 
change the constitution. In their opinion, the government controls 
the parliament, and the elected house is unable to respond to the 
public needs57. The Bahraini royal court warned organizers that 
what they were doing was illegal, and that only the National 
Assembly and the King himself had the right to propose or endorse 
constitutional changes. Eventually, several activists collecting 
signatures were arrested. In February 2004, four of these societies 
(the Wefaq, the Islamic Action, the National Democratic Action 
and the Nationalist Bloc) organized a controversial “Constitution 
Conference” to discuss the issue of establishing a genuine 
constitutional monarchy in Bahrain and for restriction of powers 
of the Shura Council to solely consultative. Later in the year, the 
government began talks with these societies aimed to end the 
stalemate over the constitutional issue and convince them to take 
part in the next parliamentary elections. The talks were, however, 
suspended by the government. In response, these groups decided 
to resort to “pressure tactics” to achieve their demands. In February 
2005, they sent to the King a petition signed by approximately 
75,000 people calling again for restoration of the 1975 constitution58. 
They plan to organize peaceful rallies and sending delegations to 
other countries, especially in the West, to meet their legislatures
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and rights organization in order to explain the whole picture of the 
Bahraini situation. The government strongly criticizes these actions 
as meant to involve foreign actors into Bahrain’s domestic politics.
The fall of 2004 brought numerous tensions between different 
actors on the Bahraini political scene. An arrest of human rights 
activist Abdul Hadi al-Khawaja after his public criticism of the 
Prime Minister, the King’s uncle, and closure of his Bahrain Centre 
for Human Rights brought opposition protests and street 
demonstrations. Then, a parliamentary committee has rejected a 
draft law proposed by the government to regulate street protests 
and public meetings, saying it was “unconstitutional” as it would 
severely restrict freedoms. On the other hand, a new press draft 
law, proposed by the Shura Council, was warmly greeted by the 
opposition as a progressive one, improving protection of journalists 
and granting them better access to information.
To summarize, while many praise King Hamad’s actions as 
really introducing some democracy in the Kingdom, the opposition 
claims that they have just been a window-dressing, calculated to 
deflect domestic and international criticism59. The Bahrain Human 
Rights Society acknowledged that Bahrain has taken 
“a giant step” in liberalizing its political system and extending 
personal freedoms but stressed that much more needs to be done: 
“Political rights have been restricted to candidacy and voting in 
the municipal and parliamentary elections when the issue is much 
broader one”60. In particular, the parliament is so weak that it was 
unable to pass even a single law in the first years of its existence. 
Nevertheless, for the first time in decades public protests became 
acceptable and there have been no arbitrary arrests. More freedom 
of worship and expression was granted to Shiites, although they 
continue to be disadvantaged in state jobs.
A possible future source of tensions can be the growing power 
of religious fundamentalists, both Sunni and Shiite. Some Bahrainis 
worry that the radicals may eventually move to restrict personal 
freedoms and attempt to amend constitution to make Sharia the
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sole source of the legislation. Religious fundamentalists already 
demand greater public observance of Islamic practices. First 
indication of this was their proposal to ban alcohol sales to Muslims, 
closing down hotels catering for weekend tourists from the GCC 
states, restricting mixing of sexes at Bahrain’s University and stop 
public concerts of Westernized Arab singers.
Yet, taking all the developments into account, Bahrain can be 
described as the most advanced GCC country in the democratic 
process.
Qatar
Qatar, the smallest GCC country, is ruled under the 1970 
constitution by male representatives of the Al-Thani family. The 
Emir holds absolute power, though he consults with leading Qataris 
on policy issues, and works to achieve consensus with the 
appointed 30-member Consultative Council (whose members have 
not changed since 1975).
In January 1992, 54 leading citizens presented the Qatari Emir 
with a petition criticizing the lack of freedom of expression in the 
media and unclear laws regarding citizenship and naturalization, 
as well as demanding the establishment of a new consultative 
assembly with “wide legislative and investigative authority through 
which actual political participation is provided”61. The authors of 
the petition called for this body to prepare immediately 
a new constitution “that guarantees the establishment of 
democracy”. The petition did not bring any results. The old Emir, 
Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al-Thani had rejected any liberalization 
of the regime, and the broadening of political participation did 
not begin until his son, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa, assumed power 
in 1995 (staging a successful coup against his farther).
The new Emir abolished the Ministry of Information, a move 
calculated to demonstrate his willingness to limit government
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censorship of the media. Then, in the new atmosphere, the now 
famous independent al-Jazeera satellite TV channel was opened. 
The channel introduced controversial and provocative new 
programs and news bulletins that criticize Arab rulers, governments 
and policies as well as the lack of rights and freedoms in the Arab 
world, and advocate the need for significant change in Islamic 
law. Opposition figures and women often participate in al-Jazeera 
programs, which quickly became the most popular TV program 
in the whole Arab world.
Next move by Sheikh Hamad was to call for general elections 
for the Central Municipal Council, a 29-member advisory body 
that oversees the work of nine municipalities. The Emir allowed 
women to vote for and run as candidates for seats in the Council62.
This latest move faced certain opposition. Eighteen noted 
Islamist figures presented a petition to the Emir that criticized the 
idea, given that such election would afford women “public 
authority” and the potential for “leadership over men”63. The 
petition, however, did not have any effect on Emir’s policies.
The first election in Qatar, even before the one to the Municipal 
Council, was for the board of the Chamber of Commerce, whose 
members had previously been nominated by the Emir. Close to 
3,700 Qatari businessmen cast secret ballots in April 1998, electing
17 members of the board. In turn, the Ministry of Education called 
for the establishment of elected student unions in all schools. In 
another exercise of democracy, in November 1998, the Ministry of 
Finance and Economy canceled the elections for the board of al- 
Muntazah Consumer Association after it had been discovered that 
the number of ballots cast was higher than the number of eligible 
voters; new elections were simultaneously called for.
The elections to the Central Municipal Council took place on 
March 8, 1999h® • On the ballot were 227 candidates, including six 
women. About 95 per cent of eligible voters participated in election 
in Doha, with only a slightly lower percentage participating in the 
rest of the country (though the number of registered voters was
- 31  -
only 22,225 people, which accounted for a small percentage of 
the total local population of approximately 160,000). The winners 
of the elections were mostly young technocrats and professionals, 
elected on the basis of personal preference or family and tribal 
ties. Significantly, two noted political figures, often critical of the 
government: Najib Muhammad al-Rubai, a former Minister of 
Justice, and Muhammad Salih al-Kawari were lost in the election. 
No women were elected, suggesting that Qatar remains 
a traditional society.
The successful municipal elections made Sheikh I lamad easier 
about conducting the next step: introduction of a permanent 
constitution (a temporary one has been in effect since 1972) 
providing for the establishment of elected parliament to be chosen 
by all Qataris, regardless of gender. On July 2, 2002, the committee 
preparing the new constitution, presented a draft of the document. 
On April 29, 2003, in a popular referendum, more than 96per cent 
Qataris voted in favor of the constitution (but only 24,000 people 
registered themselves for voting).
The constitution describes Qatar as a democratic state, grants 
universal suffrage, and confirms the role of the state in providing 
for the social, economic, and educational well-being of its citizens. 
It also confirms Qatar as a hereditary state and specifies Sharia as 
the main source of legislation. The constitution creates a 45-member 
council (Majlis al-Shura) to legislate, vote on the stage budget, 
and monitor the government activities with the right to question 
ministers and to vote them out of office through a vote of 
confidence. The 20 members of the council are to be elected and 
the remaining 15 are to be appointed by the Emir. All Qataris of 
over 18 years of age are eligible to vote and run for office. The 
constitution provides also for freedom of association, expression 
and religious practice, as well as an independent judiciary.
Emir Hamad promulgated the constitution on June 8, 2004, 
although it will not come into full effect for another year. During 
this period new constitutional institutions will be formed and
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appropriate laws enacted. In meantime, in May 2004, Emir issued 
decrees allowing creation of professional societies and trade unions 
(with a right to organize strikes).
There are at least two reasons why Emir Hamad decided to 
broaden political participation in Qatar. First, having some problems 
with the support from members of the older generation, he wanted 
to obtain it from younger Qataris, many of whom had obtained 
Western education and become more cosmopolitan. For many of 
them, democratization means making Qatar prominent among its 
neighbors, and obtaining a dynamic and leading role in the region65. 
Secondly, Hamad wanted to win friendship in the West, to oppose 
threats from his ousted father and to balance off pressures from 
his more powerful GCC neighbors, especially Saudi Arabia.
Although Qatar is sometimes described as being at the vanguard 
of democratization in the Arab world, one has to be aware of the 
shortcomings of its constitution66. It qualifies the right of people 
to assembly and does not allow operation of political parties. The 
Emir appoints the government and controls its agenda, has the 
power to block any legislation, can implement laws by decrees, 
and can dissolve the parliament at will. The legislation becomes 
law only with the vote of two-thirds majority and the emir’s 
endorsement. But this has to be understood in the country’s context. 
Qatar citizenry is free of sectarian, ethnic, or even significant 
political divisions. There is no questioning of the legitimacy of the 
ruling Al Thani family. Therefore, reforms have been promulgated 
from the top and not as a response to popular discontent.
Reforms in Qatar did not end in introducing a new constitution 
and organization of a municipal election. In particular, women 
were allowed to enter the political process. In 2003, Emir Hamad 
nominated a women to become the Minister of Education - the 
first female cabinet minister in the GCC states. At the same time 
he appointed Sheikha Abdullah al-Misnad from the ruling family 
the president of the Qatar University and another woman a public 
prosecutor - the first woman to hold such a post in the GCC
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states. Emir’s wife, Sheikha Mouza Bint Nasser al-Misnad, has 
been strongly involved in promotion of education and women’s 
rights.
Oman
Oman has been ruled since the 18th century by the al bu Said 
dynasty. After a series of internal and external conflicts in the 
1950s and 1960s, and most significantly the Dhofar rebellion, 
Qaboos bin Said al-Said carried a coup in 1970 against his 
unsuccessful father. Supported by the British, Qaboos won and 
became the Sultan. He quickly proved to be an effective and 
modern leader. Under his rule, the country advanced economically 
despite limited oil reserves; education became a government 
priority, relations with the neighbors were normalized, etc.
In the 1990s Oman made several strides towards broadening 
of the political participation; this happened on the sole initiative 
of the ruler, without any demands from the public (there is 
practically no opposition in Oman67). First, in 1991, Sultan Qaboos 
established the new Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura), 
replacing the old State Consultative Council (Majlis al-Istishari lil- 
Dawla) existing since 1981. The 59-seat Council was granted the 
right to debate on economic, social and development issues, review 
laws, evaluate government plans and question ministers, and hold 
joint meetings with the government twice a year. At the same 
time, it has no right to be heard in Oman’s foreign, defense, and 
security policies. The Sultan’s decree provided that elders, 
prominent businessmen and intellectuals from each of Oman’s 59 
provinces choose two potential assembly members and the Sultan 
appoints one of those two nominees to represent that province. 
The president of the Council is appointed by a Royal Decree, 
while his two deputies are elected by the members of the Council 
in a secret ballot.
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After the end of the first three-year term, in 1994, the Council 
was expanded to 80 seats, giving the Sultan a chance to nominate 
more people, especially former government officials, to it. In 
a groundbreaking decision, the Sultan appointed the first two 
women members of the Council. It was the first case for women 
to be allowed to participate in a political process of any kind in all 
GCC states68.
Membership of the Council was expanded to 82 persons in
1997, and to 83 in the year 2000 because of the increase in the 
country’s population. Moreover, the Sultan allowed women to stand 
for election and to vote for candidates to the Council. Over 20 
women were among the several hundred nominees in the 1997 
elections, and the Council had eventually two women members.
In 1997, Sultan Qaboos established a new 41-seat consultative 
body, the all nominated State Council (Majlis al-Dawla). This 
Council, akin to an upper house, reviews the proposals of the 
Majlis al-Shura and forwards those it deems important to the 
government or to Sultan Qaboos; it can also deal with more 
important political matters. Majlis al-Shura and Majlis al-Dawla 
together constitute the Majlis Oman, or Council of Oman69.
One of the reasons to establish new council was to give the 
Sultan a chance to accommodate those who were unsuccessful in 
the elections to the Majlis al-Shura and to eliminate potential 
tensions between rival clans, tribes and businessmen created by 
the election results. This was clearly visible in the formation of 
the first Majlis al-Dawla, whose nominated members became 
former ministers, under-secretaries, ambassadors, judges or retired 
officers. Five women were selected to it as well.
Sultan Qaboos, further supporting the idea of introducing 
women to the country political life, appointed in 1998-99 the first 
woman ambassador and named three women deputy ministers in 
the cabinet. He also included the first woman to the board of 
directors of the Omani Chamber of Commerce. In March 2003 he 
appointed a women to become President of the Public Authority
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for Craft Industries at the rank of a minister. Finally in 2004, he 
appointed three other women to the Cabinet, to manage the Higher 
Education, Tourism and Social Development Ministries.
The electoral body has been consequently expanded; in 
September 2000 elections to Majlis al-Shura the electorate was 
raised to 175,000 people, a quarter of Omani adults (as compared 
to only 51,000 in 1997 elections, about three per cent of the 
population, and 5,000 in 1991), with women accounting for some
30 per cent of the participants.
Voters were chosen by tribal councils selected by the walis or 
governors and their representatives in the country’s 59 wilayats. 
Out of them 114,567 - or 65 per cent - registered for voting, with 
87.8 per cent actually casting their ballots. The total of 541 
candidates, including 21 women, were in the fray (but only two 
women were successful, both from the Muscat governorate). In a 
move towards the goal of having the whole Majlis al-Shura elected 
directly, in 2000, candidates with the highest numbers of votes 
were for the first time automatically given seats on the Council, 
rather than being picked from among the top scores by the Sultan.
In the 2003 elections, for the first time, all Omani citizens who 
have attained the age of 21 (approximately 822,000), both men 
and women, were eligible to vote. Nevertheless, only 262,000 
(i.e. 32 per cent) registered, and only 74 per cent of the registered, 
that is around 194,000 actually cast their votes on October 2. The 
elections did not bring much change in the composition of the 
Majlis al-Shura. Only 15 women stood for election, out of 506 
candidates, and, as before, only two (actually the same as during 
the previous term) were elected, despite even the fact that a third 
of registered voters (95,000) were women.
Consultative councils quickly started to play an important role 
in the country’s political life. They met regularly, debated important 
social and economic matters, reviewed new laws, questioned 
government’s officials. Hearings at the Majlis al-Shura have been 
broadcasted live on television.
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Another action of crucial importance for the development of 
democracy in Oman, was the introduction of the Basic Law - the 
first de facto constitution - in 1996. It promulgated the principles 
governing the Sultanate, highlighted the rights and responsibilities 
of citizens, and, above all, defined the powers and duties of the 
executive. It provided for an independent judiciary, due process 
of law, freedom of press and of assembly, and prohibition of 
discrimination of any kind. Several laws and regulations required 
to implement these provisions were enacted in the following years. 
In particular, the Supreme Court in Muscat as well as courts of 
appeals in various wilayas were established, and the new press 
and publication law was introduced.
Oman has a relatively liberal environment, although the sultanate 
is an absolute monarchy with no political parties70. All matters are 
subject to the Sultan’s interpretation and decrees. He has a complete 
authority over all decision-making. The Sultan is both the head of 
the state and the prime minister, as well as the commander-in- 
chief of the armed force; moreover, he controls the portfolios of 
defense and foreign affairs. But at the same time, Sultan Qaboos 
is a fair-minded, liberal ruler who tries to maximize the support 
base for his policies by taking advice from as broad a spectrum of 
people as possible, but especially from tribal leaders, in accordance 
with Omani tradition and cultural norms. His gradual approach to 
democratization of the country and political reforms has often 
been praised in the Gulf as the best possible way to do so.
The United Arab Emirates
The United Arab Emirates is a federation of tribally-based 
sheikhdoms, established as a unified state structure in 1971. Thanks 
to huge oil revenues, the UAE managed to transform itself in a 
short period of time into a very modern and wealthy country. 
Under the constitution, rulers of the seven emirates make up the
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Federal Supreme Council, the highest legislative and executive 
body. The Council elects a state president and the president appoints 
the prime minister and cabinet. Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, 
the ruler of Abu Dhabi emirate, was the President of the country 
from 1971 till 2004. When he passed away, the presidency was 
taken over by one of his sons, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed.
The UAE have the least developed system of political 
representation among the GCC states. The male-only, ruler- 
nominated, 40-person-strong Federal National Council plays only 
an advisory role, cannot introduce bills or debate any matter of 
public concern if the government objects (that is, “if it is detrimental 
to the higher interest of the union”)71. Nevertheless, in the late 
1990s, the number of issues discussed by the Council, and the 
number of cabinet ministers appearing before it (including some 
members of the ruling family) increased. In some emirates, in 
Sharjah in particular, local consultative bodies to advise rulers 
have also been developed.
For approximately a quarter of a century, the UAE did not have 
a permanent constitution, as numerous attempts to approve one 
failed due to lack of agreement among the emirates on the 
prerogatives of the federal authorities; small emirates have 
traditionally worried that large and rich emirates, like Abu Dhabi, 
would dominate them. The temporary 1971 constitution became 
eventually permanent in 1997, though practically no changes were 
introduced to it at that time, despite the criticism that it contains 
outdated laws.
Like in all other GCC states, the judicial system comprises both 
Sharia and the secular courts. The judiciaiy is not independent; its 
decisions are subject to review by the political leadership, but the 
basic due process of law does exist. Media are controlled by the 
government but non-censored foreign television broadcasts via 
satellite and internet are widely available. The government limits 
freedom of assembly and association. Nevertheless, in general, 
the country, especially the highly cosmopolitan emirate of Dubai,
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has been much more liberal and open to the world than other 
GCC states.
Women are well represented in the workforce and are well 
educated. Until recently they did not hold any high-level positions 
in the government. Only the progressive ruler of Sharjah, sheikh 
Sultan bin Mohammed al Qasimi, appointed in the early 2000s 
several women to his local consultative council. In the interesting 
occurrence, the Crown Prince of the emirate of Ras Al Khajmah 
was dethroned by his father in June 2003, apparently largely due 
to the activity of his wife, criticized by conservative members of 
the ruling elite for being a women’s rights activist72. Finally, in 
November 2004, a woman was appointed the UAE Minister of 
Planning and Economy.
Among limited recent political moves, the UAE, under the 
pressure from the International Labor Organization, have initiated 
measures to allow formation of workers’ organizations in the 
country. Moreover, the election of officers was allowed in certain 
public institutions, including the Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry, suggesting that authorities are testing the possibility of 
introducing such democratic procedures in other public bodies.
The issue of the establishment of an elected parliament in the 
UAE has been put forward only very recently. Earlier, there was no 
pressure from the public at large to change the situation as the 
enormous wealth of the country had continued to make most people 
satisfied; there has been no opposition or any political groups 
operating in this rentier state. It was only after the Saudi municipal 
elections and the Iraqi expatriates’ voting organized in the UAE (the 
out-of-country voting managed by the International Organization 
of Migration for the Iraqi elections of January 30, 2005) that some 
members of the Emirates’ Federal National Council and the country’s 
academics raised the issue. They stressed that when millions of 
Arabs in Palestine, Iraq, and even Saudi Arabia had gone to the 
polls, the UAE could no longer continue to lag behind73. Thus, they 
begun calling for elections to the consultative council and
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municipalities as well as for transparency in the government, freedom 
of expression and independence of the judiciary. These calls were 
encouraged by the decision of the ruler of Sharjah who, in February 
2005, announced the establishment of nine local municipal councils, 
with members who at the moment are still appointed but are 
promised to be elected in future.
Gulf parliament
At the GCC level, the Consultative Council (often called the 
Consultative Commission) has functioned since 1997. It consists 
of 30 appointed members (five from each of the GCC states) and 
is charged with studying matters referred to it by the GCC Supreme 
Council. Nevertheless, so far it has been a meaningless body. 
During the December 2004 GCC summit, Bahrain submitted a 
proposal from its country’s Council of Representatives to establish 
a GCC parliament to replace the current Consultative Council. No 
decision on the matter was taken yet.
* H= *
Summig up, the Gulf monarchies - notwithstanding the actions 
mentioned above undertaken to improve the electoral process 
and expand the power of the consultative councils and parliaments 
in the GCC states - could hardly be labeled full-fledged 
democracies. The following facts attest to that:
- In Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, women still cannot participate 
in the elections.
- In the UAE there are no elections at all; In Saudi Arabia, 
only municipal elections can take place.
- In Bahrain, electoral districts are drawn with the intention 
of under-representing the country’s majority Shiite population; In 
Kuwait, small electoral districts make vote-buying easier and favor 
tribal candidates.
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- In Oman and the UAE, the consultative councils can neither 
introduce legislation nor dismiss ministers, nor can the Saudi Shura 
Council dismiss Cabinet members.
- In Bahrain and Qatar, the elected lower chamber can dismiss 
ministers only with a two-third majority, which is very difficult to 
attain.
- Bahrani and Qatari parliaments need a large majority to block 
legislation, and the Omani and the UAE Consultative Councils 
cannot block legislation at all.
In most cases, changing these realities would require 
constitutional revisions, which are very difficult to carry out. Michael 
Herb, an expert in the field, recently summed up the state of 
affairs in a commentary simply titled, “Parliaments in the Gulf 
monarchies are a long way from democracy”.74 At the same time, 
however, Herb underlined that “Gulf elections are much fairer 
than those organized by most authoritarian regimes.” In particular, 
“Kuwait’s elections compare well to those of many emerging 
democracies”. Furthermore, the Kuwaiti parliament is able to 
successfully block legislation, and has the power to mount a very 
serious challenge to the primacy of the ruling family, as it can 
remove any ruler’s minister through a no-confidence vote. The 
situation is also improving in Bahrain since political reforms were 
introduced there in the last couple of years.
Prospects for further broadening of political participation in 
the Gulf monarchies. The GCC and Western (American) 
democratization agenda
Will the broadening of political participation in the GCC states 
continue? Can the occurrences presented above actually lead 
towards the Western type of democracy?
On the one hand, there are many obstacles to the democratiza­
tion process.
First of all, as time has shown, Gulf monarchies are quite stable 
regimes, contrary to stereotypical views in the West, where they 
are frequently seen as anachronistic systems and destined to
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disappear with modernization. Thus, rulers do not always see the 
necessity to transform their regimes quickly and extensively to 
stay in power. Moreover, they do not think they need the support 
of their people to govern; constitutions and traditions legitimize 
their positions. They also feel secure given that the United States 
and other Western countries, despite their occasional rhetoric of 
criticizing non-democratic regimes, do not like to de-stabilize the 
region further after the Iraqi experience and with few exceptions 
continue to be committed to the maintenance of the GCC countries’ 
status quo due to strategic importance of oil they posses. In such 
circumstances, rulers often perceive the broadening of political 
participation in their countries as another gracious gift they may 
offer their subjects, rather than an action required to satisfy the 
vital needs of their populations. The circumstances have seemed 
different only in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait, where pressure 
from the West and the al-Qaeda terrorist attacks in the first place, 
the demands of the Shiite-led opposition in the second, and the 
activities of the Islamists political groupings in the third, are factors 
strongly influencing the change.
In turn, the “subjects” at large, maybe except of the Shiite 
population, so far do not look for major political reforms 
themselves, being worried that change could negatively affect their 
socio-economic situation. They have generally been satisfied with 
what they get from their governments, and even the existing 
extensive control the regimes exercise over them do not dispose 
them negatively to their rulers. This is why, for example, even the 
demands of opposition groups have only called for reforms, not 
for revolution: the opposition has wished to improve the operation 
of the existing regimes, not to overthrow them75. The middle class 
in the GCC states - usually the main reformist, pro-democracy 
grouping in other parts of the world - has little reason to support 
the downfall of the monarchy, which allows the monarchies to 
prosper. Similarly, the military and majority of tribal sheiks, large 
beneficiaries of the existing regimes, usually strongly support the
- 42  -
oilers. So far, there has been no “revolutionary proletariat” in the 
GCC states; in future, only a growing number of young, 
unemployed school graduates may lead to the establishment of 
such a group. Last but definitely not least, most people lack political 
awareness; the civil society, the ultimate source of political change, 
is in the very preliminary stage of development.
On the other hand, there are many factors which can further 
enhance the broadening of political representation and the 
“democratization drive”.
First of all, as has already been mentioned, in several GCC 
states: Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, there are significant 
groupings pushing for democratization. Moreover, the presence 
of active parliaments and free media, wherever they are present, 
boosts democratization process76.
Then, the economic situation can have a significant impact 
on the process. At the beginning of the 21st century, the GCC 
countries were earning far less than they used to during the oil 
bonanza three decades earlier (the very high oil prices in 2004 
temporarily improved the situation, but it is unlikely that they 
will stay at that level for a long period of time). While these 
states are still relatively rich, several are running budget deficits, 
borrowing nationally and internationally, and are turning to 
expense cutting. Moreover, while until recently many services 
were free in the GCC countries, some regimes have begun to 
charge their citizens for them, and have even considered 
introducing income taxes. Should citizens be obliged to pay for 
the running of the state, the state will be forced to open up to 
their scrutiny. “No taxation, no representation” rule began to 
change already to “some taxation, some representation”.
Another factor that can influence the change is the population 
of the GCC countries: not only is it growing at a rate that makes 
the maintenance of so generous welfare states problematic, but it 
is also becoming more literate, educated, and urban: features that 
are characteristic for other societies that, in similar conditions,
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have usually experienced a political upheaval leading to further 
democratization.
Young new leaders, who may replace old leaders of Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait, but also of the UAE and Oman in the not so 
distant future, may also speed up reforms, as occureance in Qatar 
and Bahrain showed already.
Events in the neighboring states: Egypt, Iran, Yemen, and the 
new Iraq, which all have more political representation of citizens 
in the process of governance, indirectly influence also the peoples’ 
thinking across the borders; mostly through media reports but 
also through their citizens living in the GCC states in large numbers.
Finally, there have been numerous attempts coming from the 
West, and the United States in particular, to democratize the Arab 
world. They relates to the situation in the GCC states as much as 
in other Arab countries. First of all, after 9/11, with the US- 
proclaimed “war on terror” there have been a number of voices in 
the United States calling Washington to “save the Arabs from corrupt 
autocrats and radical Islam as it once was about saving the world 
from communism” and to “pressure Arab states to democratize 
rather then shielding them”77. Rohan Gunaratna in his book Inside 
al Qaeda asks: ‘Why are so many terrorists produced by Saudi 
Arabia? Because it’s not democratic, it’s not representative of the 
people78. Commenting on elections in Bahrain, S. Rob Sobhani 
wrote in the Washington Times on November 25, 2002, that “the 
United States has a vested interest in the success of King Hamad’s 
reform movement because tiny Bahrain can be a model for the 
rest of the Arab world, especially in neighboring Saudi Arabia. 
Shi’ite compromise a majority in the oil-rich eastern province of 
Saudi Arabia, where 25 per cent of the world’s remaining oil 
reserves is located. Therefore Bahrain should be rewarded and 
singled out for its bravery, friendship and pursuit of democracy”.
Since 9/11 the goal of democratizing the Arab Middle East has 
become elevated by the American government from a verbal ideal 
to national security imperative79. Therefore, first, the administration
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decided to reorient US diplomacy and American foreign aid policy 
to lend support to pro-democracy movements in the region. In 
January 2003, the United States introduced the “US-Middle East 
Partnership Initiative”, which was aimed to spread democracy and 
political reforms in the Middle East. Then, in March, President 
George W. Bush decided to go to Iraq, believing, among other 
things, that overthrowing Saddam Hussein would allow rapid 
democratization of the country, which, as result, would produce a 
democratic boom in the Middle East, comparable to the successful 
one which occurred earlier in Eastern Europe and put the end to 
the Cold War.
On November 6, 2003, President Bush delivered the now-famous 
address on the need to strengthen democracy around the world 
and, in particular, to support its development in the Middle East. 
He called to end “sixty years of Western nations excusing and 
accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East” and to 
adopt “a new policy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle 
East”. In the follow-up, US authorities began working on the details 
of what later became known as “The Greater Middle East Initiative”. 
The project called for economic transformation “similar in 
magnitude to that undertaken by the formerly communist countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe”.
The leakage of the draft version of the project to the London- 
based Al Hayat in February 2004, was met with strong criticism 
from Arab governments, intellectuals and media, who all saw in it 
an unacceptable interference with their internal affairs80. In 
particular, Bahrain’s Prime Minister, Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman Al 
Khalifa, asserted that “the imposition of any foreign view is not in 
the interest of the countries of the region”. The Saudi Arabian 
Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal said that the US proposal 
did “include clear accusations against the Arab people and their 
governments that they are ignorant of their own affairs... those 
behind this plan ignore the fact... that we are able to handle our 
own affairs”81.
-45  -
In such a situation, facing all this criticism, the US government 
scaled down the original proposal and presented it under the new 
name “The Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative” at the 
G-8 summit at Sea Island, Georgia, on June 8-10, 200482. The 
resolution adopted at the meeting called for “partnership for 
progress and a common future with the region”. In particular, that 
goal is to be achieved through the establishment of the ‘Forum for 
the Future’, a framework for regular ministerial meetings as well 
as parallel meetings of civil society and business leaders to discuss 
political and economic reforms83. A call to settle down the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict, the idea conspicuously absent from the earlier 
version of the plan, causing wide criticism, was that time included 
in the document. The plan also acknowledged that reforms cannot 
be imposed from outside and that different societies will change 
at different rates.
Despite a new, better form, the G-8 reform plan initially received 
a cold reception in the Arab world. Only five Arab countries 
accepted President Bush’s invitation to its launch at the summit 
(from among the GCC states, only Bahrain). The most important 
Arab countries: Saudi Arabia and Egypt (as well as close US allies: 
Kuwait and Morocco) turned the invitation down, making it clear 
that they would have nothing to do with the project. The Emir of 
Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, not invited to the summit 
due to controversies related to his Al Jazeera TV station’s anti- 
American reporting, stated cautiously that “the calls for reform 
coming from abroad need reflection by the people of our region”84.
Nevertheless, after a while, Arab governments and civil society 
activists produced several declarations on the need for broad 
political, social, and economic reforms, which were definitely 
inspired by the G-8 plan85. In particular, on June 3-4, 2004, the 
Qatar University hosted a conference of Arab democracy advocates: 
civil society activists, professors, journalists and members of political 
movements from across the region. The Emir of Qatar, Sheikh 
Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, in his widely reported speech opening
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the event stated that: (1) Arab states should consider US proposals 
for democratic reform rather than reject them outright; (2) there 
are many problems “of our own creation that have nothing to do 
with the outside world”, and that in particular “do not spring only 
from the Palestinian cause”; (3) many Arabs have claimed that “if 
popular participation is broadened it would only result in bringing 
in those who would endanger peace and put an end to security. 
Yet, the adoption of reforms has always been the right way to 
stability”80. There are not many Arab leaders who would so openly 
say such things, opposing popular Islamist standpoint. The 
conference adopted “The Doha Declaration for Democracy and 
Reform”, calling all Arab states to get modern, democratic 
institutions; hold free, fair and regular elections; place limits on 
executive powers; guarantee freedom of association and 
expression; permit the full participation of women in political life; 
and end extra-judicial procedures, emergency laws, and torture. It 
also called for the creation of a body to monitor Arab governments’ 
progress on reform and to track the fate of other reform initiatives 
launched recently in the region. Finally, the declaration stated 
that “hiding behind the necessity of resolving the Palestinian 
question before implementing reform is obstructive and 
unacceptable”.
Only time can show whether such declarations will bring any 
real change in the GCC states. It remains to be seen whether the 
rulers of these countries will be bold enough to introduce further 
reforms. Democratization is always a long lasting process. One 
can foresee future developments in the GCC states, which can 
lead towards that goal, but there are also many obstacles which 
can slow it down, or even reverse. One can agree with the opinion 
of Hassan Hamdan al-Alkim that “although democracy may not 
be realized within the coming decade, it is acquiring a significant 
importance in the GCC states political life. Thus, its realization 
becomes a matter of time”87. A thought that, however, should 
always be taken into account, is that democratization may not
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immediately produce more peaceful and stable GCC regimes. The 
political reforms can weaken the existing regimes, or even de­
stabilize the countries. The opposition forces in the GCC states, 
where they exist, are to a large extent rooted in Islamic 
fundamentalism, which, if coming to power through otherwise 
praised democratic elections, can reform the political system into 
a much less democratic - of the religious theocracy type - than 
the present one. An indication of such approach can be found in 
the latest parliamentary elections in Kuwait and Bahrain where 
the Islamists won the majority and continue to press for Islamization 
of the countries88. So far, however, the development of the electoral 
process in the GCC states, as well as the enhancement of their 
parliaments’ activity, as compared to political reforms, or rather 
lack of them, in many other Arab countries, allows to look at the 
future of the democratization process in the monarchies of the 
Gulf with cautious optimism.
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